LWVUS National Popular Vote Compact Study, Supporting
Arguments
by Gail Dryden(CA), Barbara Klein (AZ), Sue Lederman (NJ), Carol
Mellor (NY), and Jack Sullivan ( CA)
The National Popular Vote (NPV) Compact provides a way to choose the
President of the United States by popular vote without amending the
Constitution. These are the arguments in favor of the NPV Compact.
The League of Women Voters of the United States (LWVUS) already has
a position in favor of abolition of the Electoral College and adoption
of the "direct-popular-vote" method for electing the president
and the vice president. The NPV Compact proposes a way to accomplish
the goal of using the direct popular vote for presidential elections.
Given that the LWVUS is already on record favoring abolishing the
Electoral College, we do not here directly address the shortcomings of
the Electoral College except to the extent necessary to present the
arguments.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Difficulty of Amending the Constitution. Amendment
of the Constitution to eliminate the Electoral College would accomplish
the goal of election of the president by popular vote, but that is a
very long process with uncertain results. People want to believe that
their votes count but the current system suggests to many that this is
not the case. Most of the electorate is also in favor of a system in
which the candidate who receives the most votes wins – over 70 percent
in some polls favor a direct election for president. Thus, a more
rapid, direct path to the national popular vote would be in the
interests of the electorate.
Amendment Necessary or Not. No constitutional
amendment is needed to implement the NPV Compact. Under the U.S.
Constitution, the states already have the right and power to implement
the change. Primary constitutional authority for the Compact is found
in Article II, section 1, clause 2.
Supreme Court cases have established that this wording gives
exclusive and complete power of appointment and mode of appointment of
electors to the states and that it is up to each state to decide how
to exercise the power as they deem fit (as long as no other provisions
are violated).
Interstate Compacts are Legitimate. The crux of the
NPV Compact proposal is an interstate compact in which states would
commit to cast their votes for the winner of the national popular
vote. Interstate compacts, involving a myriad of topics, have long
been a part of U. S. history and are, in fact, sanctioned by the
Constitution. The courts over the years have upheld such compacts and
ruled that they are contracts that bind the parties to the terms of the
agreement.
Congressional
Consent. The constitutional provision
which permits interstate compacts between states says:
"No state shall, without the consent of Congress,…enter into any
agreement or compact with another state…" U. S. Constitution.
Article 1, Section 10.
Supreme Court rulings have established that most compacts do not, in
fact, require congressional approval. However, to avoid time-consuming
litigation on this procedural issue, backers have decided to seek
congressional consent. In deference to the exclusive power of the
states to decide the manner of awarding electoral votes, the question
might be presented to Congress in the form of a bill to grant consent
to the Compact on behalf of the District of Columbia. Proponents
believe that positive action on this legislation would imply tacit
congressional consent to the Compact as a whole.
EVALUATING FAIRNESS
President of the Minority. Voters assume that the
candidate who wins an election will be the candidate that received the
most votes—either a majority or a plurality (in multi-candidate
elections). When the "victor" actually receives fewer votes
than another candidate, people are led to question the nature of our
electoral system. It is unnerving to the electorate when a country
supposedly based on majority rule ends up with a "minority"
president. This problem is eliminated under the NPV Compact.
Furthermore, presidents elected by a popular majority via the NPV
Compact would be "stronger" presidents because they would have
a greater, more democratic legitimacy.
Few Battleground States. Under the current
Electoral College system, presidential campaigns focus on a few key
states which are the determinants of an Electoral College victory or
loss. The electoral votes of these battleground states are viewed as
the lynchpins of the election, and most media and candidate attention
are focused on the few "competitive" states
whose Electoral College votes are believed to be at stake. Voters in
other states become observers of the process watching as the voters in
a very few of the fifty states are courted intensely by the
presidential candidates. Under this system, some votes are worth much
more than other votes. A large portion of the country is ignored by the
major candidates, except to the extent that the candidates visit
"safe" states in search of campaign funds to fuel their
activities in the toss-up states.
Under the NPV Compact, candidates would have to be sensitive to the
trend of opinion in all states and to develop campaign strategies that
appeal to a very broad spectrum of the electorate. In this way, the NPV
Compact would bring many more voters directly into the electoral
process and take them out of the "spectator from afar" role.
Equally important, with the outcome depending on the NPV, voters across
the country would have a sense that their vote would indeed count in a
meaningful way and this would provide stimulus for greater attention to
the campaign and greater participation in the electoral process. The
NPV Compact would make it worthwhile for candidates to campaign
throughout the country, thereby increasing interest in the election
nationwide.
State Identity. States' rights advocates argue that
it is an affront to state sovereignty to award a state's electoral
votes to a candidate who did not carry that state. This assumes that
the voters within that state care more about their state identity than
their own personal vote. The question is whether it is more important
for the winner in a particular state to receive the state's electoral
votes or for the winner of the entire country to be selected as
president. Polls indicate that only about 20 per cent of the public
support the current system of awarding all the electors of that state
on a winner-take-all basis instead of a popular vote. Seventy per cent
oppose the current system, 10 per cent are undecided, suggesting that
most voters might opt for the national popular vote over states'
rights.
Influencing the Winner. Critics of
the NPV Compact claimed that "11 colluding states" (as they
term them) could theoretically impose their will on the country because
those states contain the majority of the population and account for the
270 electoral votes needed for the Compact to take effect. While these
11 largest states do contain 56 per cent of the population, the real
likelihood of such "collusion" is extremely small as they have
little in common politically. Of the 11 states, recently five tended to
vote Republican (Texas, Florida, Ohio, North Carolina, and Georgia) and
six tended to vote Democratic (California, New York, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Michigan and New Jersey). Furthermore, the NPV Compact
has so far been enacted by four states: Hawaii (a small state),
Maryland (an average-sized state), and New Jersey and Illinois (large
states). Although passed by the Maine Senate and both houses in
Vermont, California and Rhode Island, the Compact has not been signed
into law by the governors of those states. Support for the NPV Compact
has been across the board so far and in no way limited to the largest
states.
Questioning the Approach. Opponents have portrayed
the interstate compact approach as inappropriately disregarding the
U.S. Constitution. This argument ignores the fact that many
amendments to the Constitution have begun as state actions to change
practices which could have been (and eventually were) changed by
constitutional amendment.
The very right to vote for president was begun through enactment of
laws by state legislatures - on a state-by-state basis. In 1789 only
five states permitted a direct vote for electors. By 1824
three-quarters of the states had such a right, but it was not until 1880
that a direct vote of the people was fully enacted.
Other fundamental voting changes have been accomplished through
state-by-state changes in law. Among such changes in voting initiated by
state action were the abolition of the requirement that voters be
property holders and the extension of the franchise to women, blacks
and persons under 21. All of these changes were begun by legislation in
individual states, followed by constitutional amendment, and few, if
any, questioned supporters' motives. No one criticized the approach as
an end run around the Constitution. Many citizens benefited from this
process, including women who were able to vote in some states before
passage of the 19th amendment. .
Small States. The political power of small states
would be increased under the NPV Compact. Currently, political power
generally resides in the closely divided battleground states. Few of the
22 least populous states are battlegrounds. With the NPV Compact each
vote becomes important regardless of the state; state size and
closeness of the race within a state would be less relevant.
Electing the REAL Winner. Out of our nation's 55
presidential elections, there have been four "wrong winners,"
that is, elections in which the candidate elected to the presidency is
not the person who won the most votes. This is a failure rate of 1 in
14, which does not instill confidence in the procedures for electing
the President of the United States.
When an election is a landslide, there is less chance of a
"wrong winner," but the more divided the country and the
closer the elections, the greater the chance of erroneous results. We
now appear to be in an era where many elections are close. The NPV
Compact would eliminate the possibility of a "wrong winner."
MECHANICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Enforcements: Post-Election Protection of Rules.
Some critics warn that a state legislature might, for partisan reasons
and after signing onto the Compact, change the rules for awarding
electoral votes—after the people have voted, but before the Electoral
College meets.
The drafters of the NPV Compact have anticipated such a problem and
have included a mechanism which permits a state to withdraw from the
Compact, but only according to a timetable which prevents deleterious
effect upon a particular election.
There is a black-out period from July 20th until January 20th of
presidential election years during which time a compacting state cannot
withdraw or repeal its law. This time frame was chosen because it
includes six major events relating to the presidential election (the
national conventions, the campaign period, Election Day, Meeting of the
Electoral College, counting of the electoral votes, and Inauguration
Day).
Case law supports the enforcement of such a provision holding that
interstate compacts are contracts that bind the parties to the
agreement. Further, Americans are committed to the notion of fairplay
and would react strongly to efforts by one state to "break the
rules."
Winning Levels. The winner-take-all rule
(currently used by 48 of the 50 states) is not required by the U.S.
Constitution. It is entirely a product of state law. Accordingly,
changing the winner-take-all rule does not require an amendment to the
Constitution but may be changed in the same way that it was originally
adopted, namely by the enactment of state laws by state legislatures on
a state-by-state basis.
Recounts. It is anticipated that the need for
recounts will diminish under the NPV Compact because, although the vote
count can be extremely close in battleground states, the numbers are
not close on a nationwide basis. Should a recount be necessary, the
plans and resources to conduct a recount would still be the
responsibility of the state experiencing the close vote. However, due
to the larger pool of voters, it is more likely that the national
results would not be close and, as a result, fewer statewide recounts
would be necessary.
Election Fraud. The adoption of the NPV
Compact would diminish the danger of both voter fraud
and election fraud/voter suppression. Under the current system, with
only a few battleground states in play, the temptation to engage in
election fraud or voter suppression is increased by the skewed weight of
votes in battleground states. In the Electoral College system, with
most states using a winner-take-all process, one fraudulent vote could
affect the entire state's electoral votes. Under a direct popular vote
system nationwide, one fraudulent vote has far less effect on the
outcome.
OTHER ISSUES-
Voting Rights Act. The NPV Compact is in total
harmony with both the terms and purpose of the Voting Rights Act, which
was enacted to guarantee equality of the vote throughout the United
States, particularly in relation to racial minorities. The NPV Compact's
goal is to create an equal vote for all voters throughout the United
States.
Faithless Electors. The faithless elector issue
is not a practical concern. States already have constitutional
authority to address problems as they come up. The NPV Compact,
awarding the nationwide winner the majority of electoral votes as a
base, makes the possibility of a faithless elector having any effect on
the election unlikely. Considering the support the winner would need to
garner a nationwide win, the candidate would probably earn at least
another half of the remaining votes in non-compacting states as well –
a strong support that would discourage faithless electors.
Additionally, the state electors casting their votes for president will
be from the party that won nationwide. The NPV Compact is more likely
to protect against faithless electors than does the current system.
LEAGUE ISSUES
Uniform Standards. The LWVUS
supports uniform national voting standards. The NPV Compact aims for
having all the states become members of the compact, and thus shares
the goal of a uniform and universal method of electing the President.
The fact that the Compact will become effective at a time when states
representing 270 electoral votes have joined does not change the
ultimate goal that all states adopt the Compact. Further, the NPV
Compact creates uniform standards because every national vote would be
counted equally if it were to go into effect.
CONCLUDING ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE NPV COMPACT
One of the most compelling arguments in support of the NPV Compact
is that this method ensures that the candidate who receives the most
votes in the national election is elected President, and does so by
using the Electoral College system of electing the President of the
United States. Amending the U.S. Constitution in order to eliminate the
Electoral College and, instead, establish the direct election of the
president is much more cumbersome and much less likely to succeed.
Above all, the most appealing argument in support of the NPV Compact is
that every vote, of every party and of every voter is counted fairly
and equally.
Related Files
LWVUS National Popular Vote Compact Paper Supporting the NPV Compact (Pro)(PDF) (PDF File)
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