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\_ewis & Clark County District Court STATE OF MONTANA

By: <u>Helen Coleman</u>
DV-25-2023-0000425-IJ
Abbott, Christopher David
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## MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY

JESSICA FELCHLE; BEAU WRIGHT; THE MONTANA QUALITY EDUCATION COALITION; THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MONTANA; SHARON CARROLL; SUZANNE McKIERNAN; LINDA ROST; PENELOPE COPPS; LANCE EDWARD; and CORINNE DAY,

Plaintiffs,

V.

THE STATE OF MONTANA; GREG GIANFORTE, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Montana; and ELSIE ARNTZEN, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Public Instruction

Defendants.

Cause No.: DDV-2023-425

ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER SETTING HEARING 8

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Plaintiffs, a collection of current and former teachers, parents, and nonprofit organizations, ask this Court to temporarily enjoin enforcement of House Bill 562, 2023 Mont. Laws 513, which is slated to take effect July 1, 2023. The certificate of service states that the State of Montana and counsel for the Governor and the Superintendent of Public Instruction have been given notice. For the reasons that follow, the Court declines to enter a temporary restraining order but will set a hearing on Plaintiffs' request that the Court enter a preliminary injunction while litigation pends.

A temporary restraining order with notice and a preliminary injunction are both governed by the following standard:

- (1) A preliminary injunction order or temporary restraining order may be granted when the applicant establishes that:
- (a) the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits;
- (b) the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief;
- (c) the balance of equities tips in the applicant's favor; and
- (d) the order is in the public interest.

Mont. Code Ann. § 27-19-201(1) (2023).

Although the standard is the same, its application varies because the time horizon of a temporary restraining order differs from that of a preliminary injunction: whereas the latter generally applies for the whole length of the litigation—which can last years in some cases—the former is applied for a shorter duration meant to apply only until all parties can be heard. *See, e.g., Innovation Law Lab v. Nielsen, 310* F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1156 (D. Or. 2018).

For the limited purposes of the request for a temporary restraining order, the Court need not consider whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits because it does not find that enjoining the statute's enforcement before a preliminary injunction hearing is necessary to avert irreparable injury.

Although House Bill 562 will take effect July 1, 2023, its impact will not be felt until the State has had time to implement the structure it contemplates. The newly created community choice school commission with authority to approve authorizers of "community choice schools" must first be appointed and then meet and organize itself. See HB 562 § 4. Once it is organized, school boards must apply for authority to organize community choice schools within the boundaries of its district, and the Commission has sixty days to act on these applications. Id. § 5. And before community choice schools are established and funded, the authorizers must issue requests for proposals. Id. § 9. It is only after at least some choice schools are established that public school district's face a loss of their BASE aid funding. Id. § 15. The bill itself notes that July 1, 2023, merely demarcates the starting point for these various tasks. Id. § 18.

To be sure, constitutional injury typically *is* irreparable injury. *Riley's A. Heritage Farms v. Elsasser*, 32 F.4th 707, 731 (9th Cir. 2022). And here, Plaintiffs' claims are constitutional: they contend HB 652 violates the Montana Constitution by undermining the constitutional authority of local boards of trustees and the statewide Board of Public Education; by violating the suffrage and equal protection rights of voters who, Plaintiffs claim, are excluded from participation in community choice school governing boards; by violating the right to a quality public education through community choice school exemptions from certain standards and requirements; and by appropriating public funds for //////

schools to what Plaintiffs contend are privatized entities. But none of the Plaintiffs will suffer any of these alleged deprivations of rights until, at a minimum, the community choice school commission is organized and accepting and approving applications or requests for proposals, or until the funds slated for public school districts are diverted pursuant to the provisions of Section 15 of HB 562. Plaintiffs have not shown that these events will come to pass so quickly after July 1, 2023, that the Court should intervene without first giving the State a full opportunity for hearing.

Plaintiffs argue that as soon as the law takes effect, the Commission could begin operations and incurring expenses. The relevant alleged injury, however, is the loss of funding to or disparate treatment of public-school districts, pupils, and families. At least based on the Court's reading of HB 562, Section 15 provides for reduction of BASE funding to public school districts only after a choice school is sufficiently established that enrollment estimates can be reported to the Superintendent of Public Instruction. *See* HB 562 §15(2), (4). It is not practically feasible to expect that any choice schools will be authorized—or that the mechanism in §15 for funding them will be put in motion—before Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction can be heard.

In so holding, the Court emphasizes that it offers no opinion on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims or whether they can demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The Court also offers no opinion or prediction on how Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction will fare. The Court holds simply that this is not a case where a temporary restraining order is necessary to avert irreparable injury before the State can be heard in (presumed) opposition.