



December 1, 2025

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Roman Jankowski, Chief Privacy Officer,
Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528-0655

Submitted electronically via regulations.gov

Re: Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records

Docket Number: USCIS-2025-0337

Dear Chief Privacy Officer Jankowski:

On behalf of the undersigned state and local Leagues of Women Voters (“the League”), we write in response to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) proposal to modify and reissue a DHS system of records notice (SORN) titled, “Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)-004 Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program (SAVE),” (90 FR 48948). The League urges DHS to rescind the revised SAVE SORN and revert the SAVE system to its prior authorized state.

The League is a nonprofit membership organization whose mission is to empower voters and defend democracy. The League is nonpartisan—neither supporting nor opposing candidates or political parties at any level of government—and is committed to protecting citizens’ right to vote. State and local Leagues nationwide provide voter outreach, education, and assistance to all eligible voters, including naturalized citizens. The League seeks to educate the public, their members, and eligible naturalized citizen voters about the risks of the overhauled SAVE system and how to mitigate them. Leagues across the country also provide voter registration to naturalized citizens and have naturalized citizens among their members.

The League believes that voting is a fundamental right of citizenship that must be guaranteed. The League also believes that democratic government depends on informed and active participation and requires that governmental bodies protect the citizen’s right to know by giving adequate notice of proposed actions, among other methods of transparency.

We fundamentally disagree with DHS’s implementation of an expanded SAVE system. Federal law protects all American citizens and lawful residents from improper government use of their data. After months of DHS using the expanded SAVE system without legally required transparency or public input, the League writes with concerns about the utility, legality, and tangible impact of expanding the SAVE system as proposed.

The Administration has already transformed the DHS SAVE system into a national citizenship data bank, pooling data from numerous federal agencies, including Social Security Administration (SSA) citizenship data that is known to be unreliable. SSA's citizenship data is especially unreliable for naturalized citizens because their citizenship information changes over time, and the only citizenship data SSA collects is provided by the individual at a single moment in time—when someone applies for an SSN and the corresponding card. SSA has no process for automatically updating the citizenship data it maintains, but rather relies on SSN-holders to inform SSA of any change in their status. Correcting data with SSA via in-person appointment is burdensome and complicated by diminished services due to the Administration's widespread reductions in force, including at SSA. Although both DHS and SSA have long known of the limitations of SSA's citizenship data and the challenges associated with integrating that data into DHS's systems,¹ the revised SAVE SORN acknowledges none of these well-documented issues. Troublingly, the SAVE system is currently being used by several states to purge voter rolls and open criminal investigations.

Despite DHS having made the changes months ago, the revised SAVE SORN belatedly notifies the public that the SAVE system now integrates the SSA's "Master Files of Social Security Number Holders and Social Security Number Applications, February 20, 2025 (90 FR 10025)," and includes a new "Routine Use L" to support sharing information with SSA for purposes of enabling SAVE user agencies to make citizenship determinations.

This new multi-agency data pooling arrangement is unlawful. No statute authorizes DHS to conduct bulk matching and pooling of SSA data with data provided by SAVE user agencies and data housed in DHS systems. While the revised SORN cites 8 U.S.C. § 1373 as authority, the Department of Justice has long interpreted that statute not as providing any "affirmative authority," but rather as a "limitation on the authority of government entities or officials to impose prohibitions or restrictions on disclosures by government entities or officials."² Neither § 1373 nor any other federal law authorizes DHS's expanded SAVE system.

Use of this expanded SAVE system is not only unlawful, but will also lead to naturalized citizens being wrongly targeted, investigated, forced to needlessly provide documentary proof of citizenship, and unlawfully purged from voter rolls due to data mismatches, user error, and inaccurate records. The massive increase in the number of voters at risk due to SAVE's new bulk upload and search-by-SSN functions (including either full or partial (last 4) SSNs)) exponentially increases the risks of error and harm to the millions of voters whom the League serves. The

¹ See Letter from SSA Off. of Gen. Counsel to Fair Elections Ctr. 2 (July 13, 2023), <https://fairelectionscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/SSA-Touhy-Decision-letter.July-13-2023-signed.pdf>; Westat Report to DHS, Evaluation of the Accuracy of E-Verify Findings, at 29, 34, 51, A-4 (July 2012), <https://www.e-verify.gov/sites/default/files/everify/data/FindingsEVerifyAccuracyEval2012.pdf>.

² Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, *Relationship Between Illegal Immigr. Reform & Immigrant Resp. Act of 1996 & Statutory Requirement for Confidentiality of Census Info.*, at 6 (May 18, 1999), <https://www.justice.gov/opinion/file/844106/dl?inline=>.

overhauled SAVE system utilizes unreliable SSA citizenship data to verify voter eligibility and repurposes Americans' SSA data unfairly, without prior notice or consent.

DHS itself has admitted in a Privacy Impact Assessment for the expanded SAVE system that “due to misspelling of names, transposed numbers, or incomplete information, the SAVE Program may produce inaccurate results,” and that these risks cannot be fully mitigated because DHS “does not have direct access to the Social Security Administration system to support” additional verification steps, and SAVE user agencies “may not go through all steps to ensure accuracy of information.”³ Moreover, in October of 2024, DHS acknowledged “the very serious consequences of the results produced by SAVE and its import in ensuring the right to vote for U.S. citizens.”⁴ DHS failed to sufficiently consider and account for these risks to eligible voters prior to expanding the SAVE system.

SAVE's additional verification procedures contemplate that individuals whom SAVE identifies as potential non-citizens may need to provide documentary proof of citizenship to avoid being purged from voter rolls. While DHS views this as a risk-mitigation measure, DHS fails to recognize that forcing eligible registered voters to re-prove their citizenship status itself burdens the fundamental right to vote and risks disenfranchising eligible voters. In addition to these risks, the overhauled system puts voters at risk from unwarranted criminal investigations of suspected noncitizen voting.

DHS's justification for expanding the SAVE system is also based on the empirically false premise that noncitizen voting is widespread in the United States. But extensive data shows that verified cases of noncitizen voting are vanishingly rare and statistically insignificant. For instance, a recent study by the nonpartisan Center for Election Innovation and Research reviewed suspected cases of noncitizen voting in all 50 states, and found that the “vast majority of allegations of noncitizen registration or voting appear to arise from misunderstandings, mischaracterizations, or outright fabrications about complex voter data.”⁵ Similarly, the Heritage Foundation's nationwide database of alleged instances of voter fraud identifies just 99 total cases of suspected noncitizen voting going back to the 1980s.⁶ And a 2018 decision by a federal district court in a case brought by, among others, the League of Women Voters of Kansas, was “unable to find empirical evidence that a substantial number of noncitizens

³ Privacy Impact Assessment for the SAVE Program, DHS Reference No. DHS/USCIS/PIA-006(d) (Oct. 31, 2025), <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2025-10/privacy-pia-dhsuscis006d-save-october2025%20%28002%29.pdf>.

⁴ USCIS, Letter from USCIS Director to Ohio Sec'y of State (Oct. 10, 2024), <https://perma.cc/8SN3-C88W>.

⁵ See Review of Allegations of Noncitizen Registrants and Voters, Ctr. for Election Innovation & Rsch. (July 2025), <https://electioninnovation.org/research/noncitizen-analysis/>.

⁶ Election Fraud Map, Explore the Data, The Heritage Foundation (last accessed Nov. 12, 2025), <https://electionfraud.heritage.org/search> (sort search results by “Fraud Sub-category” of “Alien”).

successfully registered to vote.” Though the court found a small number of noncitizens had registered, those instances were “largely explained by administrative error, confusion, or mistake” and the court declined to “rely on extrapolated numbers from tiny sample sizes and otherwise flawed data.”⁷

The League’s mission is to empower voters and defend democracy. Intimidating voters through threats to purge voter registration or even target voters for criminal prosecution severely weakens our democracy by chilling participation. Distressingly, the Administration’s efforts disproportionately target historically disenfranchised communities, including communities of color and new Americans. When voters are wrongly purged from voter rolls it decreases the number of voters, directly undermining the League’s mission of increasing the number of registered voters and voter participation. When voters are intimidated or must take additional steps to register or remain registered, this impedes the League’s mission of ensuring that the ballot box is accessible for all eligible voters.

The League urges DHS to reject this proposal to modify the SAVE system and to only operate the system within the confines of DHS’s legal authority. DHS and fellow agencies do not have the statutory authority to create such a multi-agency data pool, and DHS has failed to sufficiently consider the risks to eligible voters in implementing the expanded system.

The League looks forward to working with DHS to ensure that eligible American citizens can exercise their fundamental right to vote without fear.

Respectfully submitted,

State Leagues

- League of Women Voters of Arizona
- League of Women Voters of California
- League of Women Voters of Colorado
- League of Women Voters of Connecticut
- League of Women Voters of Delaware
- League of Women Voters of Florida
- League of Women Voters of Iowa
- League of Women Voters of Massachusetts
- League of Women Voters of Maryland
- League of Women Voters of Michigan
- League of Women Voters of Minnesota
- League of Women Voters of Montana
- League of Women Voters of North Carolina

⁷ *Fish v. Kobach*, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1102 (D. Kan. 2018), *aff’d sub nom. Fish v. Schwab*, 957 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2020), *cert. denied*, 141 S. Ct. 965 (2020).

League of Women Voters of Nebraska
League of Women Voters of New Hampshire
League of Women Voters of New Mexico
League of Women Voters of Nevada
League of Women Voters of Ohio
League of Women Voters of Oklahoma
League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania
League of Women Voters of Tennessee
League of Women Voters of Texas
League of Women Voters of Utah
League of Women Voters of Washington State
League of Women Voters of West Virginia

Local Leagues

Arizona

League of Women Voters of Northwest Maricopa County

California

League of Women Voters of Diablo Valley
League of Women Voters of San Luis Obispo County

Connecticut

League of Women Voters of Greater Hartford
League of Women Voters of Litchfield County
League of Women Voters of Hamden/ North Haven
League of Women Voters of Stamford
League of Women Voters of the Bridgeport Area

Florida

League of Women Voters of Martin County
League of Women Voters of Seminole
League of Women Voters of Alachua County
League of Women Voters of Broward County
League of Women Voters of Jacksonville First Coast
League of Women Voters of Lee County, Inc.
League of Women Voters of Sanibel
League of Women Voters of Sarasota County
League of Women Voters of the Upper Keys
League of Women Voters of The Villages / Tri-County
League of Women Voters of Volusia County

Iowa

League of Women Voters of Ames and Story County

Illinois

League of Women Voters of Champaign County
League of Women Voters of Deerfield/Lincolnshire
League of Women Voters of Glen Ellyn

League of Women Voters of Lake Forest Lake Bluff
League of Women Voters of Wheaton
League of Women Voters of Arlington Heights - Mount Prospect - Buffalo Grove Area
League of Women Voters of Cook County
League of Women Voters of Downers Grove, Woodridge, Lisle
League of Women Voters of Homewood-Flossmoor Area
League of Women Voters of Metro St. Louis
League of Women Voters of Naperville
League of Women Voters of Oak Park/River Forest
League of Women Voters of Palos Orland
League of Women Voters of Roselle-Bloomington Area
League of Women Voters of the Palatine, Barrington and Schaumburg Areas
League of Women Voters of Winnetka-Northfield-Kenilworth

Massachusetts

League of Women Voters of the Northampton Area

Maryland

League of Women Voters of Carroll County
League of Women Voters of Montgomery County
League of Women Voters of Queen Anne's County
League of Women Voters of Anne Arundel County

Michigan

League of Women Voters of Marquette County
League of Women Voters of Detroit Lakes Area

Minnesota

League of Women Voters of Minneapolis
League of Women Voters of Anoka, Blaine, Coon Rapids Area
League of Women Voters of Duluth
League of Women Voters of Golden Valley
League of Women Voters of Lake Minnetonka Plymouth Area
League of Women Voters of New Brighton Area
League of Women Voters of New Hope Area
League of Women Voters of New Ulm
League of Women Voters of White Bear Lake Area

Montana

League of Women Voters of Missoula
League of Women Voters of Billings

North Carolina

League of Women Voters of Dare County
League of Women Voters of Asheville-Buncombe County
League of Women Voters of Carteret County
League of Women Voters of Catawba Valley
League of Women Voters of Charlotte Mecklenburg
League of Women Voters of Lower Cape Fear
League of Women Voters of Moore County

League of Women Voters of Orange Durham and Chatham Counties

North Dakota

League of Women Voters of Plum Valley

Nebraska

League of Women Voters of Lincoln-Lancaster County

New York

League of Women Voters of Albany County

League of Women Voters of Cortland County

League of Women Voters of the Hamptons, Shelter Island and the North Fork

Oregon

League of Women Voters of Coos County

Texas

League of Women Voters of Collin County

League of Women Voters of Williamson County

League of Women Voters of the Austin Area

League of Women Voters of the San Antonio Area

Washington

League of Women Voters of Jefferson County

League of Women Voters of Bellingham/Whatcom County

League of Women Voters of Clark County